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AN INCIDENT IN THE PRRI/PERMESTA 
REBELLION OF 1958
Daniel F. Doeppers
In February 1958 certain elements of the Indonesian Army partici­
pated in a revolt against the government of President Sukarno. This 
action was centered in the outer islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi 
(Celebes), and although the major cities had fallen to the government 
by June 1958, the rebellion sputtered on until 1961. The revolt 
failed in the face of unexpectedly resolute action by the Indonesian 
government. At that time there were charges that the United States 
participated in this conflict in a limited and clandestine fashion-- 
on the side of the rebels.1 Except for the occasional rebel use of 
British or American military airfields, Western intervention has been 
difficult to trace to official agencies. This article presents evi­
dence that a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane, flown by a regularly 
assigned active duty crew, was very nearly shot down during a clas­
sified mission in the Sulawesi area on March 27, 1958.
The Incident and the Evidence
While searching for historical information on urban squatting in 
the Philippines the author read through eighteen years of the Mindanao 
Times , a reputable, remarkably long-lived, and generally ”pro-America” 
Davao City newspaper (it routinely prints U. S. Information Service 
releases). During this laborious task, two articles were discovered 
which related to the 1958 affair. Both are here reprinted in full.
U.S. PLANE FORCELANDS: STIRS TALKS IN DAVAO
Navy Bomber’s Wings Without Usual Marking 
Wing Tip has Gaping Hole With Busted Pipeline 
Say Landing Due to Engine Defect
A U.S. navy twin engine bomber, bearing serial number 
SS 128051 which forcelanded at the new runway in the 
SASA [Davao City] airport Thursday afternoon [March 27,
1958] stirred a speculation here.
While constabulary authorities and members of the 
crew explained that the plane developed engine trouble 
while on a proficiency flight over Davao, those who 
saw the plane brushed aside the explanation and ex­
pressed many conjectures.
1. James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise, Indonesia’s Civil War (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1961); David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible 
Government (New York: Random House, 1964), chapter 8; "William 
Stevenson, Birds Nests in their Beards (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1963); and Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, ’’The End of the 
Indonesian Rebellion,” Pacific Affairs, XXXVI (Spring 1963) , 
pp. 32-46.
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The twin engine aircraft, which landed on the 1,500 
meter new concrete runway was being repaired at this 
writing.
Viewed by representatives of the Times , the plane 
showed that its right wing-tip near the gas tank has a 
gaping hole about three feet long and one-half foot 
wide.
No explanation was available on why or how the 
plane sustained this damage. The bomber which is 
whitish and unlike most dark-gray U.S. navy aircrafts, 
did not carry the usual markings underneath the wings.
A small star under the right wing was painted white 
almost beyond recognition.
A UP report from Indonesia, meanwhile, disclosed 
that the Indonesian government forces seized American- 
made firearms believed dropped for the rebels by a 
"foreign unidentified aircraft" the other day.
The firearms which were allegedly dropped in 
Pakambaru, central Sumatra, were reportedly shown 
to diplomatic missions in Indonesia. Another U.S. 
navy plane, meanwhile arrived here yesterday with 
spare parts and mechanics to repair the damage.
Earlier report stated that the plane’s radio was 
dead and that plane Commander Mendenhall had to use 
the Philippine Air Line’s radio to report the incident 
to his base headquarters.
U.S. AIRFORCE BIRD THANKS MAYOR PORRAS
Capt. H. V. Bird, acting commander of the U.S.
Naval Forces in the Philippines in a letter to [Davao] 
Mayor Carmelo L. Porras recently, extended the gratitude 
of the U.S. Navy "for the warm friendliness and 
cooperative spirit shown by your people."
Bird referred to the stay here of members of the 
U.S. Navy plane crew who landed here in an emergency 
two months ago. The crew brought to Bird's attention 
the "warm hospitality and many courtesies extended to 
them during their stay." Wrote the navy commander:
"on behalf of the U.S. Navy, I would like to take 
this opportunity to thank you and the people of Davao 
for many instances of true understanding, spontaneous 
generosity, and valuable assistance shown these men 
while in your city."
Bird continued, "The warm friendliness and coopera­
tive spirit will be remembered as one of the priceless 
assets of the U.S. Navy in the Republic of the 
Philippines."2
2. "Navy Bomber's Wings Without Usual Marking," Mindanao Times (March 
29, 1958), pp. 1 and 4, and "U.S. Airforce Bird Thanks Mayor 
Porras," Mindanao Times (May 7, 1958), p. 4.
Having chanced on these scraps of history, I wondered about their 
accuracy and was later able to check out a number of specific 
points.
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The Aircraft
The Mindanao Times identified the plane which made an emergency 
landing as a "U.S. Navy twin engine bomber, bearing serial number 
SS 128051." From 1953 until its gradual replacement circa 1959, the 
AJ-2 "Savage" was the Navy's principal long-range, carrier-based, 
heavy attack bomber. It was powered by twin wing-mounted reciprocating 
engines. In addition there was also an aft center-mounted turbojet. 
Except for a small tail pipe, however, the small jet engine was en­
tirely concealed within the bulk of the fuselage. The jet's intake 
was located on the dorsal ridge--out of view of a ground level observer. 
In short the AJ-2 heavy attack bomber (built to carry an atomic 
weapon off the deck of a carrier) looked like a heavy twin engine 
plane.3 4 At a cruise speed of 230 miles per hour the AJ-2 had a one 
way range of about 1,600 statute miles. With the turbojet in use it 
could attain a true air speed of 460 miles per hour.
A specialized version of this plane, the AJ-2P, was designed for 
long range photo reconnaissance. It carried flares for night photo­
graphy but was not armed. Except for an extra camera lens nipple 
the AJ-2P was almost indistinguishable in appearance from the more 
common AJ-2.1* In 1950 the U.S. Navy placed an order for twenty-three 
AJ-2P's with the North American Aviation factory in Columbus, Ohio. 
Factory records reveal that the eleventh plane built under this 
contract was number 128051.5 The plane was delivered to the Navy 
around 1953.
In Sum, there definitely was an aircraft designated 128051 in 
the U.S. Navy's inventory, and it looked very much like a "twin 
engine bomber."
The Squadron
The Mindanao Times article identified the aircraft in question 
with the prefix "SS." These double letters are a short hand sign 
for the particular squadron to which the aircraft and its crew were 
assigned. The fact that the first letter falls in the latter half of 
the alphabet already indicates that the squadron was assigned to the
3. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1955-1956, pp. 298-299. See also 
Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Aviation in Review,
Navaer 00-80T-58 , 1958, and Naval Aviation News (November 1958) , 
p. 17.
4. For an account of the AJ-2P's purposes and capabilities see "Cameras 
Are Their Weapons," Naval Aviation News (November 1958), pp. 7-12.
5. This information was kindly provided by Mr. James Tichenor, Public 
Relations Office, North American Rockwell, Columbus, Ohio, in 
conversations on March 8 and 9, 1971.
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Pacific fleet. But, more specifically, the Navy confirms that "SS 
128051" was assigned to Heavy Photographic Squadron Sixty-One (VAP-61).6 
Then, as now, this squadron was stationed on Guam. From there small 
detachments range widely, carrying out specific assignments for a 
variety of federal agencies. Some of the purposes and activities 
of VAP-61 were discussed in Naval Aviation News during 1958.
In war or peace, photographic squadrons provide 
aerial photographic intelligence in support of naval 
operations. Obtaining complete coverage of sensitive 
areas is absolutely essential. Since stockpiled 
intelligence becomes obsolete rapidly, new material 
must be gathered continuously.
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Pictures of target run-ins are invaluable in 
briefing attack squadron pilots. Shot from an 
altitude of several hundred feet to 40,000 feet 
with various focal length cameras, photographs 
aid air intelligence officers to brief pilots 
accurately on target location and identification.7
The Color and Star Insignia
A star identification insignia appears on the underside of the 
right wing of all standard U.S. Navy planes. The reporter for the 
Mindanao Times was justified in suspecting something amiss upon 
discovering that the right underwing insignia "was painted white 
almost beyond recognition." On the other hand he was incorrect in 
stating that most U.S. Navy aircraft were dark gray in color. The 
color scheme for Navy carrier aircraft was changed during 1956 to 
a lighter shade. (A light or white color tends to reflect rather 
than absorb the flash of a nuclear detonation.)
The Men
The Mindanao Times named a "plane Commander Mendenhall." In 
1958 there were six commissioned or warrant officers named Mendenhall 
on active duty with the U.S. Navy. Only one was a qualified naval 
aviator (pilot) and a Commander. He was Sy Elton Mendenhall (born 
1919), regular line officer, graduate of the General Line School, and 
holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross.8 Military records indicate
6. Letter from the Public Affairs Officer of COMNAVAIRPAC (Commander 
Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet), N.A.S. North Island, 
San Diego, February 16, 1971.
7. November, 1958, pp. 8 and 9 respectively. See also Naval Aviation 
News (January 1956), p. 31 and (February,1955) , pp. 14-15.
8. Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States 
Navy and Marine Corps and Reserve Officers on Active Duty, NAVPERS 
15,018 (January Tj 1958), alphabetical index and p. 52. This 
"Register" is updated and reissued every year.
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that S. E. Mendenhall was not only assigned to VAP-61 in March 1958, 
but that he was its commanding officer as well.
The MCapt. H. V. Bird, acting commander of the U. S. Naval Forces 
in the Philippines/’ whose letter to the mayor of Davao City was 
quoted in the Mindanao Times, was Horace Virgil Bird. Bird was 
promoted to Rear Admiral in 1963 and is still on active duty.9 Bird 
was probably not in the direct chain of command for this particular 
flight, but rather entered in when the plane was forced to land at 
Davao.
Commander Mendenhall, now retired from the Navy, recently con­
firmed these facts, i.e., that he did land an AJ-2P reconnaissance 
plane at Davao City in March 1958 and that the plane had a substantial 
hole in the wing.10 He declined to discuss those aspects of his 
mission he understood to be ’’classified.” But it is possible to trace 
out what his mission must have been if one places it in the context of 
what was happening in Indonesia at that time.
The Indonesian Rebellion of 1958
1957 and 1958 were years of crisis for Indonesia. Severe economic 
problems, as well as the continuing revolt by the Darul Islam (a 
militant Muslim movement) troubled the Central government on Java, 
and regional movements, led by territorial commanders, challenged 
its mandate in the outer islands, particularly Sumatra and Sulawesi.
On granting independence to Indonesia, the Dutch had retained a 
colonial toehold in western New Guinea (West Irian), and by 1957 Indo­
nesia was demanding its return. When the United Nations refused to 
support Indonesia’s case against the Netherlands, President Sukarno 
ordered the seizure of Dutch businesses and plantations. Not without 
logic on nationalist grounds, the move had a serious effect on the 
economy. In some cases Dutch enterprises were taken over by labor 
unions, many of which were dominated by the PKI (Indonesian Communist 
Party)--thus giving rise to official American fears of a communist 
takeover.
At this time many of the territories outside of Java were to a 
large degree functionally autonomous and were virtually under the 
control of local army officers. This autonomy was in part maintained 
by smuggling, especially to Singapore, of local products such as 
crude rubber, copra, etc.
Conflicting interests between Java and the major outer islands 
are a fact of Indonesian life. Java supports a population of extra­
ordinary density and must import many of its basic requirements. On 
the other hand, Sumatra, Borneo, and Sulawesi are very large islands 
with much lower population densities and considerable export sur­
pluses. The regional commanders justified their smuggling by con­
tending that Djakarta was not returning a fair share of the wealth 
derived from outer island resources, especially royalties from the 
oil fields of Sumatra and Borneo.
9. Register (1958), p. 12; (1963), p. 3, and (1970), p. 1.
10. Telephone conversation, December 30, 1971.
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During the latter part of 1957 there were numerous conferences 
among the dissident military commanders of Sumatra and Sulawesi. By 
early 1958 they had been joined by several civilian leaders from 
Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), and on February 10 
the group served an ultimatum on the Djakarta government. Their prin­
cipal demands were the ouster of the cabinet led by Premier Djuanda 
with its unnamed "communist sympathizers," its replacement by a govern­
ment without communist participation headed by Hatta and the Sultan 
of Jogjakarta, President Sukarno’s return to a constitutional position, 
and the abandonment of his efforts to implement Guided Democracy.11 
When these demands were rejected, the rebels proclaimed a counter­
government (PRRI). The insurgent colonels entertained hopes that 
the commanders of other military regions in the outer islands (who 
certainly shared their sentiments) would also join in the demands, and 
reasoned that Sukarno was too weak and indecisive to move against 
them militarily. The rebels’ confidence was increased by the sup­
portive attitude of the United States. On the day after the rebels’ 
ultimatum, Secretary of State Dulles stated at a press conference in 
Washington:
We would like to see in Indonesia a government which 
is constitutional. . . . There is a kind of ’guided 
democracy’ trend there . . . which may not quite 
conform with the provisional constitution, and 
apparently does not satisfy large segments of the 
population.12 13
Central Sumatra, the home area of the Moslem Minangkabau was the 
original center of the revolt (Figure 1). It was joined by Tapanuli 
to the north (the Christian Batak region) and by the distant Minahasa 
peninsula of northern Sulawesi, another Christian area. The commanders 
of Palembang and Atjeh (at opposite ends of Sumatra) did not, however, 
proceed to open rebellion.
To the shock of the rebels, President Sukarno and Chief of 
Staff Nasution took decisive action. By later February Indonesian 
Air Force B-25’s and P-51’s had begun bombing and strafing rebel 
groups in Sumatra and northern Sulawesi. The government imposed a 
blockade against the rebel regions, and Indonesian gunboats forced 
ships in the Straits of Malacca to stop at several checkpoints before 
proceeding to Singapore. Many vessels and their valuable cargoes 
of smuggled goods were impounded. Other ships were blockaded in the 
rivers of east Sumatra or in the ports of Padang and Menado. As 
Singapore’s Straits Times observed on March 24, "While a few small 
smuggling boats may still be able to run the gauntlet of Jakarta’s 
500 assorted gunboats the grim fact is that Central Sumatra’s trade 
has come to a standstill."*3
11. On this see Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: 
Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 
Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1966), pp. 1-298.
12. Reported in Time (February 24, 1958), pp. 27-28.
13. (March 24, 1958), pp. 1 and 3. All this was a serious, though 
temporary, blow to the Singapore economy. In the same paper 
see the accounts of the blockade in the editions of March 1,
3, 4, 17, 1958, etc.
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On March 12, government paratroopers dropped almost unopposed 
on the vital rebel "held" oil fields around Pakanbaru in Central 
Sumatra.1 * After brief skirmishes the rebels withdrew to the interior 
Despite the flurry of press releases from both sides there was little, 
if any, heavy fighting. The rebels knew the territory and clearly 
could carry on a persistent guerrilla campaign as they had against 
the Dutch--but would they? Rebel Prime Minister Sjafruddin was 
reported to have issued a statement that SEATO must recognize the 
rebels and choose sides "as they had in [the Civil War of] Spain."14 5 
In an attempt to win official recognition the rebel Finance Minister, 
Dr. Sumitro, was dispatched to Washington.16 But on April 18, Padang 
was taken by the Indonesian army and marines almost without resistance 
The fall of Bukittinggi, the rebel capital, just three weeks later, 
signalled the end of the rebellion as a major movement on Sumatra.
The rebellion had failed to achieve broad based support; only the 
Christian Batak area, some guerrilla bands in Atjeh, and the 
Minahasans of northern Sulawesi had been persuaded to join.
Despite its lack of political viability, the PRRI had clearly 
been expecting support from abroad and had apparently had little 
difficulty securing arms and munitions. Assurances had evidently 
been received from the "representatives" of certain Western powers 
that substantial help would be forthcoming,17 and, in fact, a con­
siderable amount of military equipment had already been delivered.
When the Indonesian paratroopers dropped on Pakanbaru in the early 
morning of March 12, they surprised a group of rebels loading 
canisters of arms on trucks. Other canisters with parachutes still 
attached littered the ground. The military material seized that day 
also included "mobile anti-aircraft guns."18 A week earlier two 
American destroyers had arrived in Singapore, soon joined by the 
U.S. cruiser Bremerton, all of which, according to official reports,
14. The Straits Times (March 13, 1958), p. 1; (March 14, 1958), p. 2 
and an eyewitness account (March 31, 1958), p. 3.
15. The Straits Times (March 26, 1958), p. 3. At the SEATO conference 
then being held in Manila, Secretary of State Dulles said that the 
question of extending recognition of belligerent status to the 
rebels was being examined by State Department "legal advisors," 
Ibid. (March 14, 1958), p. 2.
16. Dr. Sumitro and Major Jan Pantouw left Singapore on April 1 as 
"radio operators" on an unscheduled plane operated by the Civil 
Air Transport company. The plane proceeded via Labuan in North 
Borneo and Manila. Major Pantouw had just returned from 
Honolulu three weeks earlier. The Straits Times (March 14, 1*958) , 
pp. 2 and 9; (March 20), p. 3; (April 1), p. 1, and (April 3),
p. 7.
17. See Mossman's discussion of the role of United States Information 
Service library officials in Padang and Medan in trying to bring 
the Masjumi party into the revolt, and the comments of the British 
consul in Medan to the effect that he hoped the Colonels realized 
" . . .  that the Central Intelligence Agency isn't the same as
the American Government." Mossman, Rebels, pp. 68-71. See also 
Stevenson, Birds, p. 145.
18. Mossman, Rebels, pp. 109-110; The Straits Times (March 14, 1958), 
p. 2, (March 15, 1958), p. 1, and (March 16, 1958), p. 14; Steven­
son, Birds, p. 96, and Howard P. Jones, Indonesia: The Possible 
Dream (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 116-117.
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were standing ready to evacuate Americans from the Sumatran oil 
fields.19 20 Elsewhere there was speculation that these and other units 
of the Seventh Fleet might openly oppose the reimposition of Djakarta's 
authority over Sumatra. 0
Reports of outside aid to the rebels persisted during the coming 
weeks. In April an anonymous correspondent in Sumatra encountered a 
forty-five man rebel patrol packing
. . . astonishing firepower. Eight out of nine light
arms were late-model, American-made, automatic weapons.
The patrol had a 60-millimeter mortar, a couple of 
3.5 inch bazookas, a pair of 57-millimeter recoilless 
rifles, and machine guns.21
The correspondent noted that this was more firepower than a U.S. army 
patrol had carried in Korea. Rebel officers with the patron volun­
teered that they had received brief training in the use of the 
various weapons from two foreigners in Padang. In April rebel soldiers 
manning a crossroads outpost at Taluk, Central Sumatra were inter­
viewed by James Mossman. As he put it: "They had lit fires, and the 
plane had come and the weapons had floated down. Whose plane? Ah, 
that they couldn't say."22 There were charges that the arms had been 
dropped by Royal Australian Air Force planes.23 24 The Australian Air 
Minister denied complicity. Lieutenant Colonel Sukendro, Chief of 
Intelligence of the Indonesian Army, said that the air-dropped arms 
had been sent from Taiwan, though he did not explicitly implicate the 
Nationalist Chinese government. 2“*
In late March The Straits Times reported
Mystery surrounds a Nationalist Chinese Civil Air 
Transport C 46 aircraft which has been making constant 
"test flights" from the Singapore Airport for the past 
three weeks.
The plane arrived in the Colony on March 6. . . .
The crew of the plane has been changed twice. The 
latest replacements flew into Singapore from Taipeh 
late last Saturday. . . .
The crew appear to have nothing to do other than 
to make constant "test flights."
19. The Straits Times (March 12, 1958), p. 1 and New York Times (March 
12, 1958).
20. See Newsweek (March 17, 1958), pp. 42-44, (March 24, 1958), p. 44 
and U. S. News and World Report (March 21, 1958), p. 83.
21. U. S. News and World Report (April 18, 1958), p. 55, written by 
Regional Editor, Robert P. Martin. See also the same magazine 
(July 25 , 1958) , pp. 71-72.
22. Mossman, Rebels, p. 146.
23. The Straits Times (March 15, 1958), p. 1, and Newsweek (March 24, 
1958) , p. 40.
24. The Straits Times (March 22, 1958), p. 1.
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Malayan Airways is looking after the plane Mfrom 
the engineering side."25
For its part
The Royal Air Force . . . denied that any of its 
airfields in Singapore had been used as bases for 
aircraft supplying the Sumatran rebels.
The denial followed a claim from Jakarta that 
Indonesian intelligence agents in Singapore had 
observed unidentified aircraft, which had been 
used for dropping arms to Sumatran rebels, landing 
at night at Changi [a British Air Base on Singapore 
island] for refueling.26
From the rebel side Dr. Sumitro said the American-made arms captured 
at Pakanbaru were indeed dropped by Civil Air Transport.27 (Civil 
Air Transport, based in Taiwan, is the successor to General Chennault’s 
World War II Flying Tigers and has often been linked to secret U.S. 
[i.e., CIA] activity in Asia.28)
Despite the rapidly deteriorating situation in Sumatra, outside 
help for the rebels in Sulawesi increased in late April. There the 
rebels had mysteriously acquired a talented air force. Four American- 
made twin-engine bombers and two P-51Ts began ranging out from 
airfields near Menado. The Straits Times reported that the first raid 
on the government airport at Makassar was made on April 13.29 The 
British tanker San Flaviano was bombed and destroyed at the Royal 
Dutch Shell facility at Balikpapan on April 28. The next day Lloyd’s 
of London reported that a Greek steamer had been strafed while carry­
ing survivors of an Italian freighter sunk by the rebel air force.30 
On the Banda Sea and in the Makassar Straits, Panamanian and Indo­
nesian merchantmen also suffered strafing casualties.31 And an 
Indonesian Navy corvette was sunk in the harbor of Ambon. For a 
time in the second half of April and early May, Djakarta’s naval 
blockade of Menado was disrupted.32
25. "Plane Mystery," The Straits Times (March 28, 1958), p. 6. The 
same plane left Singapore on April 1 with Dr. Sumitro and Major 
Pantouw as passengers. "2 Rebel Leaders Do a Cloak and Dagger 
Air Exit," The Straits Times (April 1, 1958), p. 1. The Indo­
nesian government asked Singapore to ban such planes. The Straits
26. The Straits Times (April 15, 1958), P- 1.
27. Stevenson, Birds, p. 135.
28. For example Wise and Ross , The Invisible, chapter 8.
29. The Straits Times (April 15, 1958), P- 1.
30. The Straits Times (April 29, 1958), pp. 1 and 3, and
1958) , pp. 1 and 9.
31. Only after substantial delay was news of these strikes printed 
in Time (May 21, 1958, p. 33) and Newsweek (May 19, 1958, pp. 50 
and 52).
32. During this period the rebels received arms by ship from Taiwan. 
Mossman, Rebels, p. 222.
192
On April 29, the rebels announced that, following sustained 
bombing, their troops had captured the airfield on Morotai, a small 
island north of Halmahera (the runway there was originally built 
and used by General MacArthur's allied command during 1944 and 
1945).33 For the next several weeks the rebel air force continued 
to harass the sea lanes, ports, and airfields within the arc of 
Menado and Morotai.3 *
It was not until the end of May that the rebel planes ceased 
their raids. A month later, after stiff ground fighting, Menado 
fell. Despite continued guerrilla fighting which tied down several 
battalions of government troops until 1961, the rebellion as a broad 
movement was over. On May 20, John Foster Dulles said that the 
United States, too, had once suffered civil war and it was his view 
that the current civil war should be handled as an internal matter 
by Indonesians "without intrusion from without."35 Modest aid for 
President Sukarno's government was soon announced in Washington.
For some time much of the American press appeared to be mystified 
by these planes and their skillful pilots. Commonwealth journalists 
James Mossman and William Stevenson, however, separately reported 
that each had interviewed Minahasan sailor-smugglers in British North 
Borneo who had seen a number of Americans in Menado and understood 
them to be pilots of the rebel war planes. Mossman, whose stories 
appeared in the Australian press, claims that soon thereafter some 
Americans approached the Australian Department of External Affairs in 
Canberra and suggested that his presence on the scene could be 
embarrassing to the West.36 Stevenson later wrote that the rebel 
bombers reached Menado from Taiwan by way of the Labuan Island 
airfield in British North Borneo. One of his sources said
These bombers fly in [to Labuan] from Formosa, see.
Night landings. Quick refuel job, then orf [off] at 
first light. Mostly dropping supplies to these rebels, 
like. Sometimes they've bombed Indonesian ports. . . .
The planes are painted black, no identification. Crews
33. The Straits Times (April 30, 1958), p. 1.
34. Clearly all this represented an attempt to neutralize the approaches 
to Minahasa, to deny the central government vital revenues, and
to pressure President Sukarno by disrupting the channels of inter­
island and foreign circulation. It may also have been an attempt 
to force economic decentralization and breakup by pushing merchant 
marine insurance rates up to the point that regular shipping 
could no longer enter the area.
35. Jones, Indonesia, p. 149.
36. Mossman, Rebels, p. 201 and Stevenson, Birds, p. 213. U. S. News 
and World Report (May 9, 1958), p. 37 was least equivocal among 
the American magazines: "There is no mystery about the planes.
They are B-25 Mitchells, U.S. made twin-engine light bombers 
which came from Formosa. Most probably they are part of an un­
official 'lend-lease' arrangement among anti-communists in Asia." 
What was to be "leased" in return for the "loan" was not mentioned.
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are Chinese and Yanks. Nice young fellers, in 
civies. Well paid too.37
Any doubt about the accuracy of these accounts was dispelled by the 
events of May 18, when one of a small group of black, unmarked twin- 
engine planes bombing and strafing Ambon harbor and town was shot 
down--its pilot an American named Allan Lawrence Pope.38 It later 
came out that Pope, from Dade County, Florida, had flown 55 combat 
missions in the Korean War while serving in the United States Air 
Force and had won the Distinguished Flying Cross. After Korea he 
flew for Civil Air Transport. Then in 1958 he took nleave of 
absence" to fly for the rebels, presumably at the behest of the 
CIA--at a reported salary of $10,000 a month.
Given this context, the incident of March 27, 1958 at Davao’s 
new civil airport can be more easily understood. The Mindanao Times 
article and two eyewitnesses interviewed by this author in 1969 indi­
cated that the explanation of engine failure was a prevarication. In 
their view, the AJ-2P could only have been so damaged by cannon 
(i.e., anti-aircraft) fire. Clearly the plane could not return to 
one of the U.S. military airfields on Luzon because the damage it 
had suffered made it imperative to land as soon as possible; a 
carrier landing would have been even more hazardous. A small 
protrusion in an airplane’s wing surface--to say nothing of a three 
foot hole--causes a plane to yaw dangerously toward the damaged side. 
Further, the "busted pipeline" may have meant loss of fuel or of the 
hydraulic pressure necessary to operate the flap system. In that 
case, a high speed landing approach and a long runway would have been 
required. Clearly, the mission ended safely only because of an 
extraordinary feat of piloting.
What had SS 128051 been up to and how was it damaged? The fact 
that the plane had its official insignia deliberately obliterated by 
white paint indicates the clandestine nature of its flight. Also 
the mission was clearly one of great importance or it would not have 
been flown by the squadron commander himself--the highest ranking and 
most experienced pilot available.
On several grounds it can be deduced that the photographic targets 
of the mission were in the general area of Sulawesi. Because flying 
and landing so damaged an aircraft entailed grave risk, one can be 
certain that Davao was the substantial "friendly" airfield nearest the
37. Stevenson, Birds, p. 193. Ambassador Jones reports that in early 
May, 1958 a member of his staff visited the U.S.A.F.’s Clark Air 
Base in the Philippines and saw a "plane with wings painted black 
in one corner of the field" and thus assumed U.S. Government 
knowledge and permission for help being given the rebels. Jones, 
Indonesia, p. 143.
38. Pope was tried, convicted, and held by the Indonesian Government 
until July 2, 1962, when he was quietly flown back to the United 
States. Six months later he was flying for another clandestine 
American air service. Wise and Ross, The Invisible, chapter 8; 
Jones, Indonesia, pp. 129-130 and 140-141; "Captive Adventurer," 
Newsweek (June 9, 1958), pp. 40 and 45 and (January 11, 1960), 
p. 41; Time (May 9, 1960), p. 35, and Stevenson, Birds, pp. 193- 
215.
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place where the damage was sustained. Because of the distance in­
volved, it is quite unlikely that the Mindanao Times was correct in 
inferring that the plane had been damaged over Pakanbaru.
March 27 was before the first rebel air raids in East Indonesia.
It is most likely that the AJ-2P was gathering photographic intelli­
gence on the facilities and defensive arrangements of various harbors 
and airfields in the area, including Makassar and Morotai. To requote 
the U. S. Navy on the purpose of this plane--*’pictures of target run- 
ins are invaluable in briefing attack squadron pilots."39 Obviously, 
the aircraft was damaged while making a low altitude pass, but, until 
further information is made available, the exact ’’targets11 of the 
mission will remain in doubt. Nevertheless, one may speculate that 
the photographs obtained by SS 128051 were used in the subsequent 
raids on Sulawesi ports by the American-piloted bombers.
One further question remains to be answered. On whose instruc­
tions did the March 27 flight take place? Rear Admiral D. L. Kauffman, 
who a decade later followed Bird in command of American naval forces 
in the Philippines area, told the author that during his own tenure 
orders for so sensitive a flight would have come from the White 
House.40 But this may have been an arrangement of the Johnson era. 
Commander Mendenhall recalls that his orders were issued by the Pacific 
headquarters in Hawaii (CINCPAC), but is certain that they were 
authorized by the Chief of Naval Operations and possibly by the White 
House (National Security Council).
Unfortunately, the information concerning this mission is in­
sufficient to resolve the question of whether CINCPAC (from its naval 
bias) promoted the rebellion and perhaps tried to give the Pentagon 
a fait aeoompli , but was ultimately forced to abandon the failing 
rebels41 or whether, as is generally accepted and as I believe, the 
brothers Dulles cooked up the rebellion, hired the bombers, etc., but 
called on the Navy for the specialized craft and crew need for pre­
strike photographic intelligence gathering. The point is that in 
either case the authorization of a U.S. Navy mission involves govern­
ment officials--not just the "intelligence-community" types who have 
often enough appeared to operate without the detailed knowledge of 
official Washington to say nothing of ambassadors on the scene.42
39. See footnote 7.
40. Conversation, June 18, 1971.
41. This line of reasoning is suggested by Dr. Sumitro.
There was a time when we had the support of the United 
States Seventh Fleet. But then the United States 
opposed us, and said we were not much better than 
bandits. It became a struggle between Pearl Harbor and 
the Pentagon. . . . Yes. It was Pearl Harbor against 
the Pentagon.
(Interview with Stevenson, Birds, p. 236.) In contrast to the Navy 
the U.S. Army may have opposed aiding the rebellion for fear of 
undermining or alienating anti-communist Indonesian Army leaders.
42. See Wise and Ross, The Invisible, "Burma: The Innocent Ambassador," 
pp. 129-135 and Jones, Indonesia, pp. 143-145. Former Ambassador 
Jones makes no mention of the rebel use of the old MacArthur base
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Recently Howard P. Jones, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia during 
the rebellion, has written that the United States supplied military 
aid to the rebels, but that he, as ambassador, was not privy to 
this policy.1,3 Indeed Jones went to great lengths to report to 
Washington that Dr. Mohammad Hatta, Chief of Staff Abdul Haris 
Nasution (a Sumatran), and other influential Indonesians in Djakarta 
saw this rebellion not as a struggle centered on "communism" but 
rather as a distressing attempt to break up the Indonesian state. 
Apparently ignoring such counsel, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles and his brother Allen, head of CIA, chose to deal with the 
situation as an adjunct of the Cold War.1** For the most part military 
material and other help appear to have been delivered or carried out 
through secret "non-official" organizations. These charges were 
denied by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, both of whom 
said that any Americans participating in the rebellion were "soldiers 
of fortune" over whom the United States Government had no control. 5
on Morotai, the destruction of the British tanker at Balik apan, 
or whether the British ambassador knew of the rebel use of 
Labuan and other airfields.
43. Jones,
44. Ibid.,
Indonesia, p. 143.
pp. 118, 121, 138, and 143-145.
45. Ibid., pp. 131 and 134-135.
